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THE UNIFORM RULES OF EVIDENCE AND THE
NORTH DAKOTA LAW OF EVIDENCE-
LEO H. WHINERY**
Introduction
A T a time when the lawyers of this State are considering the
adoption of new rules of civil procedure,1 it is equally appropri-
ate that we should turn our attention to the consideration of a
related and important subject of law reform - the Uniform Rules
of Evidence adopted by the Conference of Commissioners on Uni-
form State Laws in 1953.2 In many respects, pleading and evidence
both have a similar objective. Each has been the subject of similar
struggles to throw off the bounds of the pre-twentieth century
formalistic procedural era when the rules were applied with a rigid
adherence to precedent resulting in the acceptance of principles
without questioning their merits or effectiveness in the trial of issues
of fact. Each has been the subject of frequent revision and pro-
posals for reform by qualified judges, lawyers and teachers who
have endeavored to translate the workable and unworkable of ex-
perience into acceptable criteria for the future. However, the
similarity fades noticeably when one compares the interim ex-
periential development of the two. The Field Code, the Federal
Rules of Civil and Criminal Procedure and contemporary procedur-
al reforms in many of the states highlight the search for workable
rules governing pleading and practice. With the exception of a
few isolated instances of piecemeal revision, progress in the reform
of the law of evidence has indeed been slow. The Uniform Rules
is but the latest in a series of proposals for change that have been
made from time to time.
The English reformer, Jeremy Bentham, was one of the first to
advocate a departure from the rigid exclusionary principle govern-
ing the admissibility of evidence.3 James Bradley Thayer,4 Roscoe
oThis is the first in a series of articles devoted to this subject.
*Assistant Professor of Law, University of North Dakota
1. See, e.g., Holtzoff, New Civil Procedure in North Dakota, 32 N. Dak. L. Rev. 81
(1956); Crum, The PropoSed North Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure, 32 N. Dak. L.
Rev. 88 (1956).
2, Handbook of the National Conferance of Commissioners On Uniform State Laws,
102-103 (1953). See Handbook at 164 et seq. for the complete text of the Rules.
3. Bentham, A Treatise On Judicial Evidence (Dunmont 1825).
4. Thayer A Preliminary Treatise On The Law Of Exidence 509 (1898).
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Pound,5John H. Wigmore," and many others have followed him in
speaking out against the illogicalities and inconsistencies inherent in
the rigid application of the exclusionary rules. One of the early
organizational efforts in this country to secure changes in the law
of evidence was the work of a committee headed by Professor Ed-
mund M. Morgan under the auspices of the Commonwealth Fund.-
The Committee dismissed as impractical the early suggestion of a
single reform either by abolishing the rules of evidence generally or
the preparation of a model code of evidence. Rather it dealt with
Specific reforms and finally recommended the passage of five uni-
form statutes.8 But after nine years very few states had adopted
even these modest recommendation of the Committee.' In 1937 a
committee of the section of Judicial Administration of the American
Bar Association conducted a study directed toward revision.1" In
its report submitted a year later the Committee recognized the
value of the rules of evidence in their skeletal framework, but
criticized the petty elaboration and distinction that had crept into
the law." Its report dealt with recommendations both as to general
features of procedure in the administration of rules of evidence and
changes in specific rules governing the admissibiity of evidence
which it deemed most necessary, feasible and simple.12 Although
the American Bar Association approved these recommendations, "
there are no specific changes in the law which appear to have re-
sulted directly from the work of this Committee.
The first major project began in 1939 when the Director of the
American Law Institute announced the appropriation of funds by
the Carnegie Corporation for the drafting of a model code.14 The
original intention of the Institute had been to restate the law of
evidence. However, the ultimate conclusion was that the existing
defects and confusions could be remedied only by legislative action.
Professor Morgan was named Reporter with Professor John M.
5. Pound, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice,
29 A.B.A.Rep. 395 (Pt. I 1906), reprinted, .20 J.Am.Jud. Soc. 178 (1937), with an
introduction by Wignore, Roscoe Pound's St. Paul Address of 1906-The Spark That
Kindled the White Flame of Progress at 176.
6. Wigmore, Evidence xiv (3d ed. 1940), (hereinafter cited as Wigmore).
7. Morgan, The Law of Evidence: Some Proposals For Its Reform (1927).
8. Id. at xix-xx.
9. Tracy, What Progress in Reform of Evidence Rules?, 20 J.Am. Jud. Soc., 80,81
(1936). See also, Morgan & Maguire, Looking Backward and Forward at Evidence, 50
Harv. L. Rev., 909 (1937).
10. 62 A.B.A.Rep. 58 (1937). -
11. 63 A.B.A.Rep. 570, 576 (1938).
12. Id. at 571 et seq.
13. Id. at 154.
14. 16 Proc. Am. Law Inst. 46 (1939).
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Maguire as his Chief Assistant and Professor Wigmore as Chief
Consultant.-3 The Model Code of Evidence was completed and
approved by the Institute in 1942.16 During the three year period
of drafting, the Reporter and his assistants had the benefit of debate
by the members of the Institute and suggestions and criticisms of
judges and lawyers composing the Evidence Editorial group of the
Institute, as well as those of various lawyers throughout the country
at bar association meetings where the proposed Code was dis-
cussed.17 However, soon after its approval it became apparent that
the Model Code would not be accepted by the profession generally.
The principal criticism centered aro'Und the liberal modification of
the exclusionary rules and the resultant discretion given to the trial
judge. 18 The Reporter and Committee did not expect universal and
immediate acceptance although the ultimate hope was that the
Model Code would find more general acceptance than it has.'9
In 1943 the Committee on Jurisprudence and Law Reform of the
American Bar Association was charged with the duty of studying
the need for improving the law of evidence in the federal courts.
Among other proposals for reform, it was to consider the Model
Code as a basis."° The Committee reported back in 1944 and the
House of Delegates approved its proposal that the American Bar
Association recommend a study of the Model Code by the Advisory
Committee on the Rules of Civil and Criminal Procedure of the
Supreme Court to determine the extent to which its provisions
should be adopted as rules of procedure.21 This proposal has not
resulted in any elaboration on Rule 43 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure governing the admissibility of evidence in the federal
courts. 22 The Model Code has not been enacted into law in any
jurisdiction.
During the period 1920-1949, the Conference of Commissioners
on Uniform State Laws also devoted considerable attention to the
15. Ibid.
16. 19 Proc. Am. Law Inst. (1942).
17. Model Code of Evidence, ix-xii (1942). For transcripts of the debates by the
Institute, see 17 Proc. Am. Law Inst. 66-148 (1940) (Tentative Draft No. 1); 18 Proc.
Am. Law Inst. 84-252 (1941) (Tentative Draft No. 2); 19 Proc. Am. Law Inst. 74-257
(1942) (Proposed Final Draft).
18. 20 Proc. Am. Law Inst. 49-52 (1943). See also, Wigmore, The American Lao
Institute Code of Evidence Ruless A Dissent, 28 A.B. A.J. 23 (1941); Panel Discussion,
Spotlight on Evidence, 27 J. Am. Jud. Soc. 113, 114 (1943).
19. 20 Proc. Am. Law Inst. 49-52 (1943).
20. 68 A.B.A.Rep. 146 (1943).
21. 69 A.B.A.Rep. 185 (1944).
22. Clark, Foreword to Symposium on Uniform Rules of Evidence, 10 Rutgers L. Rev.
479, 482 (1956); Morgan, Future of the Law of Evidence, 29 Tex. L. Rev. 587 (1951);
Armstrong, Proposed Amendments to Federal Rules for Civil Procedure, 4 F.R.D. 124, 138
(1946).
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law of evidence. A number of uniform and model acts designed to
remedy specific evidentiary problems were promulgated by the
Conference.2 3 , Its efforts have received a measure of success by the
adoption of these acts in one or more of the various states.2 4 How-
ever, in view of the unfavorable reception given to the Model Code
and the still recognized need for general legislative revision, the
Executive Committee recommended in 1948 that the Conference
cooperate with the American Law Institute in adopting or revising
the Model Code or otherwise establishing uniform rules of
evidence.25 This proposal was referred to the Civil Procedure Acts
Section of the Conference..2 6 A special section committee was then
appointed to study and prepare the drafts.2, The Committee includ-
ed Judge Spencer A. Gard of Iola, Kansas, as Chairman, three
practitioners and three law teachers.2 ,9 Later a committee under the
chairmanship of Professor Morgan was appointed to represent the
American Law Institute to advise with the Conference committee
to the end that the Uniform Rules might receive the approval of
the Institute.21 Initially, the Conference committee recognized the
value of the thorough and candid work of those responsible for
the drafting of the Model Code and based its preparation of the
Uniform rules on this proposal. However, experience had shown
that the far reaching changes manifested in the Model Code were
not acceptable to the profession generally. It was then determined
that each of the Model Code rules should be tested by the criteria
of acceptability and uniformity. The rules meeting these tests were
retained; those that did not were either modified, revised, or reject-
ed. 30 The final draft of the Uniform Rules was submitted to and
approved by the Conference on August 22, 1953.1 They were then
approved by the American Bar Association. 2 The American Law
Institute gave its approval in 1954. 31 The Uniform Rules have
23. For a list of these model and uniform acts with the adopting states, see Handbook
of Nat'l Conf. of Comm. on Uniform State Laws 303-304 (1955).
24. Ibid.
25. Handbook of Nat'l Conf. of Comm. on Uniform State Laws 92 (1948).
26. Handbook of Nat'l Conf. of Comm. on Uniform State Laws 46 (1949).
27. Id. at 190
28. Joe E. Estes, Dallas, Texas; John Carlisle Pryor, Burlington, Iowa; Robert E.
Woodside, Attorney General, Harrisburg, Pennsylvania; Dean Mason Ladd, University of
Iowa Law School; Charles T. McCormick, Professor of Law, Uiversity of Texas; and
Maynard E. Pirsig Professor of Law, University of Minnesota.
29. Handbook of Nat'l Conf. of Comm. on Uniform State Laws 162 (1953).
30. Id. at 161-163-for a complete summary of the Conference committee approach and
its work.
31. Id. at 102-103. For interim reports of -the Conference committee see Handbook
of The Nat'l. Conf. of Comm. on Uniform Stats Laws For 1951 and 1952.
32. 78 A.B.A. Rep. 134 (1953).
33. The Proposed Act thus has overwhelming professional approval.
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attracted considerable attention throughout the country.34 It appears
that they may soon be enacted into law in at least two jurisdictions
- New Jersey and Puerto Rico.35
The foregoing highlights the struggle for evidence reform in the
United States. There are few areas of the law in which there has
been more agitation, more scholarly effort and more money expend-
ed toward reform than in the law of evidence. Yet today the law
remains unchanged generally. The influence of precedent, the
natural inclination to cling to the familiar and the burden of learn-
ing "new rules and procedures" reflect the reluctance of the lawyer
to accept change. The fact that judges and lawyers may apply
the existing evidentiary rules with considerable common sense in
the trial of issues of fact in the large majority of cases may also
explain partly the satisfaction with the status quo.86 Notwithstand-
ing, the Uniform Rules represent the latest expression of the cumula-
tive effort of many qualified lawyers in the devising of a system of
rules designed to improve rather than retard the administration of
justice.
It is also true that the Uniform Rules have not as yet been sub-
jected to the test of application. In a few instances, previously
promulgated model and uniform acts - the substance of which
are now found in some of the Uniform Rules - have been adopted
in some states,37 including North Dakota.38 But even though the
Uniform Rules have not had significant application, they are still
supported by the same wealth of scholarship and experience that
attended the Federal Rules when they were adopted in 1938. Ex-
perience has demonstrated the value of this procedural reform
generally.1 This is not to suggest that the one gives rise to the
conclusive validity of the other because the problems are not the
34. Symposium on Minnesota and the Uniform Rules of Evidence 40 Minn. L. Rev.
297 (1956); A Symposium on the Uniform Rules of Evidence, 10 Rutgers L. Rev.
479 (1956); McCormick Some High Lights of the Uniform Evidence Rules, 33
Tex. L. Rev. 559 (1955); Gard, Kansas Law and the New Uniform Rules of Evidence 2
Kan. L. Rev. 333 (1954); Symposium on the "Uniform Rules" and the California Law of
Evidence, 2 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 1 (1956); Symposium on Uniform' Rule of Evidence
and Illinois Evidence Law, 49 Nw: U.L. Rev. 481 (1954).
35. Clark, Foreward to Symposium on the Uniform Rules of Evidence, 10 Rutgers L.
Rev. 479 (1956).
36. Id. at 480.
37. See note 23 supra.
38. Handbook of The Nat'l Conf. of Comm. on Uniform State Laws 328 (1955):
Business Records as Evidence Act, (1937); Judicial Notice of Foreign Law Act, (1937);
Official Reports as Evidence Act, (1937); and Photographic Copies of Business and Public
Records as Evidence Act, (1951).
39. For example, see Holtzoff, A judge Looks at the Rules After Fifteen Years of Use,
15 FR.D. 155 (1954); Hawkins, Discovery and Rule 34; Vhat's So Wrong About
Surprise?, 39 A.B.A.J. 1075 (1953).
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same in every case. It does suggest that the Uniform Rules deserve
serious attention in the various jurisdictions.
In 1954 the Committee on Uniform Laws of the North Dakota
Bar Association gave its endorsement to the Uniform Rules and
recommended that they be introduced in the Legislature.4 0 A
Judicial Council committee was appointed later in the year by
Justice James Morris with Dean 0. H. Thormodsgard as Chairman
to study the Uniform Rules and determine the desirability of their
adoption in this State.41 The following - together with the sub-
sequant installments - is in the nature of a report to the Committee
and the lawyers of this State. The subject will be dealt with in three
basic divisions: (1) a comparative analysis of the Uniform Rules
and the North Dakota law; (2) the conclusions derived from the
comparative analysis; and (3) some observations on the methods of
promulgation.
ORGANIZATION AND FORM OF THE UNIFORM RULES
The Uniform Rules consist of seventy-two rules grouped in nine
articles: I. General Provisions; II. Judicial Notice; III. Presump-
tions; IV. Witnesses; V. Privileges; VI. Extrinsic Policies Affecting
Admissibility; VII. Expert and Other Opinion Testimony; VIII.
Hearsay Evidence; and IX. Authentication and Content of Writings.
The American Law Institute's Model Code contains the same basic
organization - the only change made in the Uniform Rules is in the
order of the articles.42 The Model Code contains one-hundred
thirteen rules as against seventy-two in the Uniform Rules. This
difference is due in part to the treatment of some of the material -
particularly in connection with the exceptions to the hearsay rule -
as subdivisions to a particular Uniform Rule rather than as separate
rules as in the Model Code. However, word volume in the Uniform
Rules has been reduced by changes in language and the rearrange-
ment of materials.
One of the basic questions confronting the American Law In-
stitute in the drafting of the Model Code dealt with method and
style. For this purpose, Professor Wigmore submitted six postulates
which the Institute should agree upon: (1) the rules of evidence
should be stated as they ought to be and might practically be made;
(2) the rules should furnish a complete code; (3) the rules should
40. 30 N. Dak. L. Rev. 361 (1954).
41. The other members of the committee are: Philip R. Bangs, Grand Forks; Judge
0. B. Burtness, Grand Forks; Paul C. Matthews, Professor of Law, University of North
Dakota Law School; and Norman G. Tenieson, Fargo.
42. Model Code of Evidence xviii-xxii (1943).
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not contain scientific generalizations in terms of expression which
were complex, novel and unfamiliar to the bench and bar; (4) the
rules should not deal with abstraction, but with all the specific rules
exemplifying the abstraction; (5) any changes in an existing rule
should be expressly stated and not left to implication; and (6) the
comments should not contain any statement amounting to a rule of
practice additional to the text of the rule.43 With the exception of
the fourth, agreement was reached generally on all of the foregoing
postulates, although there is some disagreement as to whether the
Model Code as finally written manifested the spirit of them.4 4 The
Uniform Rules do follow the first and third postulates more closely
than does the Model Code. The only other difference of significance
to us here in connection with the' two proposals arises in connection
with the fourth postulate.
The importance of the fourth postulate is evident by the degree of
attention which was drawn to it in debate by the members of the
Institute. 4 5 Should the Model Code be stated in detail and embody
all of the concrete rules exemplifying the application of an abstrac-
tion? Should the Code be stated in generalities as exemplified by
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure? Or, should a compromise
position be adopted? The first - or Wigmore - view was directed
toward providing a code of detailed directory provisions for the
guidance of the Bench and Bar.46 The second - or Clark - view
is characterized as the other extreme. Judge Clark argued that every
detailed statement results in an additional opportunity for litigation,
necessitates judical construction of all the language used, and
stymies further development in the law of evidence. 4T Also, the
Wigmore approach inevitably results in an almost unworkable
mass of rules which-when applied to future unanticipated cir-
cumstances - may also result in the same sort of illogical and
inconsistent application that evidence reform is designed to over-
come.
However the Clark view is not entirely free of difficulaties.
Generality in treatment often necessitates judicial elaboration.
Judge Clark has recognized this problem as it relates to the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure and suggests that it may only be overcome
by frequent revision based upon experience in working with the
43. 17 Proc. Am. Law Inst. 66-87 (1940).
44. Wigmore, The American Law Institute Code of Evidence Rules: A Dissent, 28 A.B.A.
J. 23 (1941).
45. 17 Proc. Am. Law Inst. 70-87 (1940).
46. For example, see Wigmore, Code of Evidence (2nd ed. 1935).
47. Id. at 81-84.
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rules.48 In-so-far as evidence may be characterized as procedural,
the problem as presented is one of finding a system rigid enough to
secure equality in treatment and systematize the disposition of
litigation, yet flexible enough to provide for individuality in treat-
ment and give due regard to the substantive rights of the parties in
specific cases.49 The American Law Institute resolved this basic
problem in drafting by accepting the Morgan view which represent-
ed a compromise in the two extremes. The approach in the drafting
of the Uniform Rules leans more in the direction of the Clark view.
This underlying policy consideration should be kept in mind in our
consideration of the Uniform Rules. We shall have occasion to
refer to it again when we consider the methods of adoption.50
GENERAL PROVISIONS
Rule 1 contains the definitions. These are set forth in the footnotes
and no attempt will be made here to present a discussion of their
content.a1 The definitions which need further elaboration will be
dealt with in the discussion of other rules where they are relevant.
48. Clark, Special Problems in Drafting and Interpreting Procedural Codes, 3 Van.
L. Rev. 493, 507 (1950).
49. 2 Holdsworth, History of English Law 251 (3d ed. 1923); Clark, The Handmaid
of Justice, 23 Wash. U.L. Q. 297, 300 (1938).
50. See the discussion in a later installment dealing with observations on the promulga-
tion of the Uniform Rules.
51. Rule 1. Definitions.
(1) "Evidence" is the means from which inferences may be drawn as a basis of proof
in duly constituted judicial or fact-finding tribunals and includes testimoy in the form of
opinion, and hearsay.
(2) "Relevant evidence" means evidence having any tendency in reason to prove any
material fact.
(3) "Proof" is all of the evidence before the trier of the fact relevant to a fact in issue
which tends to prove the existence or non-existence of such fact.
(4) "Burden of Proof" means the obligation of a party to meet the requirements of
a rule of law that the fact be proved either by a prepoderance of the evidence or by
clear and convincing evidence or beyond a reasonable doubt, as the case may be. Burden
of proof is synonymous with "burden of persuasion."
(5) "Burden of producing evidence" means the obligation of a party to introduce
evidence when necessary to avoid the risk of a directed verdict or peremptory finding
against him on a material issue of fact.
(6) "Conduct" includes all active and passive behavior, both verbal and non-verbal.
(7) "The hearing" unless some other is indicated by the context of the rule where the
term is used, means the hearing at which the 'question under a rule is raised, and not some
earlier or later hearing.
(8) "Finding of fact" means the determination from proof or judical notice of the
existence of a fact. A ruling implies a supporting finding of fact; no separate or formal
finding is required unless required by a statute of this state.
(9) "Guardian" means the person, committee, or other representative authorized by
law to protect the person or estate or both of an incompetent (or of a sui juris person
having a guardian) and to act for him in matters affecting his person or property or both.
An incompetent is a person under disability imposed by law.
(10) "Judge" means member or members or representative or representatives of a court
conducting a trial or hearing at which evidence is introduced.
(11) "Trier of fact" includes a jury and a judge when he is trying an issue of fact other
than one relating to the admissibility of evidence.
(12) "Verbal" includes both oral and written words.
(13) "Writing" means handwriting, typewriting, printing, photostating, photographing
and every other means of recording upon any tangible thing any form of communication or
representation, including letters, words, picture, sounds or symbols, or combinations thereof.
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Rule 2 provides that the Uniform Rules shall apply in all court
proceedings, both civil and criminal.52 The rule also encourages
the uninhibited admissibility of evidence by providing that the
Uniform Rules should not modify other procedural rules which re-
lax the rules of evidence for specified purposes.
5
1
RULE 3. Exclusionary Rules Not to Apply to Undisputed
Matter. If upon the hearing there is no bona fide dispute
between the parties as to a material fact, such fact may be
proved by any relevant evidence, and exclusionary rules shall
not apply, subject, however, to Rule 45 and any other valid
claim of privilege.
This rule eliminates the necessity for the strict observance of
the rules in the proof of matters which do not involve a real dispute
even though they may be in issue in the pleadings. Under Rule 45,
it is subject to the discretion of the judge to exclude evidence where
its probative value is substantially outweighed by the risk that its
admission will unduly consume time, create a substantial danger of
prejudice, confuse the issues, mislead the jury or unfairly and harm-
fully surprise a party. It is also subject to a valid claim of privilege.
The rule is motivated by the same policy considerations giving
rise to the provisions for the simplification of substantive issues
in pre-trial procedure under Rule 16 of the Proposed Rules of
Civil Procedure. To otherwise insist upon a strict application of the
evidentiary rules in the absence of a bona fide dispute is to en-
courage a waste of the time of the courts and impose unnecessary
expense on the litigants and the public. Such a rule has been urged
previously by the Commonwealth Fund Committee, 4 the American
Bar Association,5" and the American Law Institute in its Model
Code.
5 6
RULE 4. Effect of Erroneous Admission of Evidence. A
verdict or finding shall not be set aside, nor shall the judge-
ment or decision based thereon be reversed, by reason of the
erroneous admission of evidence unless (a) there appears of
record objection to the evidence timely interposed and so
stated as to make clear the specific ground of objection, and
(b) the court which passes upon the effect of the error or
errors is of the opinion that the admitted evidence should have
been excluded on the ground stated and probably had a
52. Rule 2. Scope of Rules. "Except to the extent to which they may be relaxed by other
procedural rule or statute applicable to thd specific situation, these rules shall apply in
every proceeding, both criminal and civil, conducted by or under the supervision of a
court, in which evidence is produced."
53. Ibid.
54. See note 7 supra at 1 et seq.
55. See note 11 supra at 596.
56. Model Code of Evidence rule 3 is the same in substance. The Model Code rules
will be hereinafter cited as the Model Code.
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substantial influence in bringing about the verdict or find-
ing.
5 -
This rule and the analogous Rule 5-set out in the footnotes-
dealing with the erroneous exclusion of evidence reject the early
English rule permitting reversals for errors which might have
affected the result5 s Conversely, they do not manifest the extreme
view of forbidding reversals except when the court is convinced
the error was of controlling importance.5 9 The court is required
to exercise its judgment as to the effect of the error on the finding
and reverse if it probably had a substantial influence in bringing
about the result. Both rules also require an entry in the record of
the objection to the admission of the evidence or the substance of
the evidence sought to be introduced. The tenor of these rules is
among the proposals adopted by the American Bar Association in
1937.60
In North Dakota the erroneous admission or exclusion of evidence
does not constitute reversible error unless it is prejudicial." An
early decision of the Supreme Court defined prejudice to mean that
it must actually appear or the presumption must be strong, that
the party seeking a reversal was injured by reason of the error in
some substantial interest or right involved in the proceeding.2
Later decisions have determined the question of prejudice by
examining the record to ascertain whether the errors affected the
jury63 or were such as to destroy the probability of a fair trial."
These holdings are in accord with the result which the farmers of
the Uniform Rules contemplate under Rules 4 and 5.65 While the
57. The analogous rule 5 dealing with the erroneous exclusion of evidence is as follows:
"Rule 5. Effect of Erroneous Exclusion of Evidence. A verdict or finding shall not be
set aside, nor shall the judgment or decision based thereon be reversed, by reason of the
erroneous exclusion of evidence unless (a) it appears of record that the proponent of the
evidence either made known the substance of the evidence in a form and by a method'
approved by the judge, or indicated the substance of the expected evidence by questions
indicating the desired answers, and (b) the court which passes upon the effect of error or
errors is of the opinion that the excluded evidence would probably have had a substantial
influence in bringing about a different verdict or finding."
58. Rules 4 and 5 of Uniform Rule are the same as Model Code rules 6 and 7.
59. Model Code of Evidence 79-80 (1942).
60. See note 11 supra at 575.
61. Admission: Bale v. Brudevig, 77 N.D. 494, 43 N. W. 2d 753 (1950); Kohler V.
Stephens, 74 N.D. 655, 24 N.W.2d 64 (1946); Zilke v. Johnson, 22 N.D. 75, 132 N.W.
640 (1911); McGregor v. Harm, 19 N.D. 599, 125 N.W. 885 (1910). Exclusions
Wipperman Mercantile Co. v. Bobbins, 23 N.D. 208, 135 N.W. 785 (1912); Cockrane v.
National Elevator Co., 20 N.D. 169, 127 N.W. 725 (1910); State to use of Hart-Parr Co.
v. Robb-Lawrence Co., 17 N.D. 257, 115 N.W. 846 (1908).
62. Burdick v. Haggart, 4 Dak. Rep. 13, 22 N.W. 589 (1885). Prior to the decision in
the Burdick case, North Dakota adhered to the old English rule. People v. Wintermute, 1
Dak. Rep. 63, 46 N.W. 694 (1875); Yankton Co. v. Rossteuscher, I Dak. Rep. 125, 46
N.W. 575 (1875).
63. Olson v. Wetzstein 58 N.D. 263, 225 N.W. 459 (1929).
64. First National Bank v. Davidson, 48 N.D. 944, 188 N.W. 194 (1922).
65. Handbook of The Nat'l. Conf. of Comm. on Uniform State Laws 166-167 (1953).
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Supreme Court appears to have applied the old English rule in at
least one later case,66 the recent decision in Bale v. Brudevig in-
dicates a more consistent application of the rule as it is embodied
in the Uniform Rules.67
The requirements in Rules 4 and 5 for record notice of the
erroneous admission or exclusion of evidence as a condition pre-
cedent to reversal are not novel in North Dakota. The party com-
plaining of the erroneous admission of evidence must make a
timely objection68 and the grounds or reasons which render the
evidence inadmissible must be specified.6 9 Pursuant to Section
28-2728 of the Code, it is not necessary to take any exceptions or
settle a statement of the case when the error upon which a re-
view is sought appears upon the face of the record. 70 However,
in the absence of this circumstance, a party appealing from a
judgment of the trial court must prepare a concise statement of
the specifications of error on the admission of evidence and point
out wherein it was erroneous or prejudicial."1 The Supreme Court
will not review where the duty is placed upon it of exploring the
record to find the claimed error.
7 2
A consistent application of the well recognized North Dakota
rule requiring an offer of proof where it is claimed evidence has
been erroneously excluded would follow if Rule 5 were adopted.
The rule that a party must offer to prove the facts sought to be
elicited by the challenged evidence before error can be assigned
has been consistently followed in this State.73 If the purpose and
purport of the testimony sought to be elicited is apparent from the
record then strict compliance with the rule of offer of proof is
66. Stoskoff v. Wicklund, 49 N.D. 708, 193 N.W. 312, 315 (1923): "There is no
question but that very wide latitude and discretion must be permitted the trial court, but,
notwithstading the trial court's determination in this particular matter, we believe that the
examination may have been so prejudicial in its effect that on account of the same a
mistrial should have been declared."
67. 77 N.D. 494, 43 N.W.2d 753 (1950).
68. Grant v. Jacobs, 76 N.D. 1, 32 N.W. 881 (1948); Acker v. Jardine, 58 N.D. 430
226 N.W. 483 (1929); State v. Dahlquist, 17 N.D. 40, 115 N.W. 81 (1908).
69. Smith v. Knutson, 78 N.D. 43, 47 N.W.2d 537 (1951); Kolka v. Jones, 6 N.D.
461, 71 N.W. 558 (1897).
70. N.D. Rev. Code of 1943. See Morris, A Memorandum on Appellate Practice, 29 N.
Dak. L. Rev. 219, 222 (1953).
71. N.D. Rev. Code J 28-1809 (1943). O'Dell v. Hiney, 49 N.D. 160, 190 N.W. 774
(1922). Morris, supra note 70, at 222-223.
72. O'Dell. v. Hiney, supra note 71; State v. Dahlquist, 17 N.D. 40, 115 N.W. 81
(1908). See Newton, Appellate Practice and Procedure in North Dakota, 27 N. Dak. L.
Rev. 155, 166 (1951).
73. Froh v. Hein, 76 N.D. 701, 39 N.W.2d 11 (1949); Whittier v. Leifert, 72 N.D.
528, 9 N.W2d 402 (1943); Stair v. Hibbs, 52 N.D. 910, 204 N.W. 621 (1925); Farmer
v. Holmes, 35 N.D. 344, 160 N.W. 143 (1916).
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relaxed. 74 In either case, Rule 5 would not change the existing law.
In this connection, it is significant to note that Rule 43(c) of the
Proposed Rules of Civil Procedure also deals with the record of
excluded evidence. 75 The procedure for the offer of proof under
this rule is basically the same-although more detailed-as provid-
ed in Rule 5 of the Uniform Rules. However, Rule 43(c) goes on
to provide that in actions tried without a jury". . . the court upon
request shall take and report the evidence in full, unless it clearly
appears that the evidence is not admissible on any ground or that
the witness is privileged." While Rule 5 applies to both jury and
non-jury actions,7" it does not contain this proviso which obligates-
as distinguished from the discretionary tenor of Rule 5-the court
in non-jury actions to report the excluded evidence in full upon
request.7 7 Depending upon the future of the proposed rules in this
State, some attention should be given to this inconsistency. Perhaps
Rule 43(c) is better. One of the purposes of the latter would appear
to be to encourage the making of complete record in the first
instance in non-jury actions and thus avoid delay in the final dis-
position of the case resulting from a return of the case to the trial
court to take excluded evidence .
7
RULE 6. Limited Admissibility. When relevant evidence is
admissible as to one party or for one purpose and is inadmis-
sible as to other parties or for another purpose, the judge upon
request shall restrict the evidence to its proper scope and
instruct the jury accordingly.
This is a restatement of the well recognized doctrine that
evidence admissible for one purpose which satisfies all the rules
applicable to it in that capacity is not inadmissible because it does
not satisfy the rules applicable to it in some other capacity. 79 The
rule is followed in both civil and criminal cases in North Dakota."'
As is required in Rule 6, the Supreme Court of North Dakota has
held that the party must point out the purpose for which the
evidence is not admissible and request the court to limit the jury's
74. International Shoe Co. v. Hawkinson, 72 N.D. 622, 10 N.W. 2d 590 (1943):
Foot Schuze & Co. v. Skeffigton, 52 N.D. 307, 202 N.W. 642 (1925). For an
application of the exception to the rule in criminal actions, see State v. Michelsld, 66 N.
D. 760, 268 N.W. 713 (1936).
75. Proposed Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 43 (c).
76. See note 52 supra.
77. See note 57 supra.
78. N.D. Rev. Code § 28-2732. See also, Rule 28 of the Rules of Practice in Causes
in the Supreme Court of North Dakota, 76 N.D., xvii, xxvii (1950).
79. McCormick, Evidence § 59 (1954). hereinafter cited as McCormick. 1 Wigmore §
13 (3d ed. 1940).
80. Smith v. Knutson, 78 N.D. 43, 47 N.W.2d 537 (1951); Janssen v. Kohler, 71 N.D.
247, 299 N.W. 900 (1941); Krogh v. Great West Life Assurance Co., 55 N.D. 722, 214
N.W. 897 (1927); Starke v. Stewart, 33 N.D. 359, 157 N.W. 302 (1916). As to
criminal action, see State v. Gimmick, 70 N.D. 463, 296 N.W. 146 (1941).
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consideration to the purpose for which it is admissible."S The effect
of a failure to request the court to instruct the jury to restrict the
evidence to its proper scope under Rule 6 would necessarily result
in a waiver of the right to an instruction on limited admissibility.
It has been so held in North Dakota.8 2 If the danger exists that the
jury would ignore the judge's instruction, he would have the right
under Rule 45 to exclude the evidence where its admission might
create a substantial danger of undue prejudice or of confusing the
issues or misleading the jury."3 The trial court has the same discre-
tion in North Dakota.
8 4
Rule 6 has already been the object of some criticism by a
Minnesota writer as involving the use of evidence to the prejudice
of a party concerning whom it is inadmissible, such as a co-defen-
dant. 5 Thus, the jury should not be led to believe that an admission
admissible as to one party is admissible as to the other. However,
the salutary results that are often achieved through the joinder of
claims should not result in the abandonment of a doctrine which
is indispensable as a practical rule, particularly when, for example,
under the existing North Dakota law or under the Proposed Rules
of Civil Procedure separate trials may be ordered to avoid prejudice
to the parties.8 6 But this presents only one application of the rule.
Its practical indispensability is seen more clearly in those instances
where the evidence has more than one purpose, but only one for
which it can be admitted. For example, evidence of repairs and
alterations may not properly be admitted to prove antecedent
negligence, although it may be admissible to explain or rebut
other evidence.8 7 There is no more of an argument available for
the exclusion of the evidence on the ground of its aptitude to show
the unauthorized fact than there is for its admission to prove
another authorized fact. The rule of limited admissibility involves
certain dangers, but its effective control can only arise through
proper instructions to the jury. 8 In this respect, the criticisms of
the Minnesota writer are more convincing.
He argues that the effect of Rule 6 is to prohibit the explanation
of the effect of limited admissibility to the jury until the court
81. Smith v. Knutson, supra note 80.
82. Smith v. Knutson, supra note 80.
83. Handbook of The Nat'l. Conf. of Comm. on Uniform State Laws 167 (1953).
84. Krogh v. Great West Life Assurance Co., 55 N.D. 722, 214 N.W. 897 (1927).
85. Geer and Adamson, The Uniform Rules of Evidence: A Defendant's View, 40
Minn. L. Rev. 347-348 (1956).
86. N.D. Rev. Code § 28-1213 (1943). Proposed Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 43(b).
87. Smith v. Knutson, 78 N.D. 43, 47 N.W.2d 537 (1951).
88. Wigmore, J 13 (3d ed. 1940).
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gives its instructions. If the terminology in Rule 6 is used in the
technical sense then a literal interpretation of the rule calls for
this result. He argues that the trial judge should". . explain to
the jury the reason for the admission of the evidence at the time
it is presented to the jury."' 9 Due to the human element this might
provide a greater protection against the jury giving the evidence
more scope than it would be entitled.90 The effect of an instruction
at the end of the trial might be lost in the many matters of law
to which the jury must give its attention at that time. There would
seem to be no objection to informing the jury on both occasions.
The most recent North Dakota case may be taken as supporting
either or both procedures.9 1-
Finally, it should also be mentioned that Rule 6 is the only rule
in the Uniform Rules which touches upon the much discussed ques-
tion of the right of a judge to comment to the jury upon the
evidence. Rule 8 of the Model Code of Evidence authorizes a
judge to sum up and comment to the jury upon the weight of the
evidence and the credibility of witnesses. 92 However, it has not
found universal acceptance even though it is the historic rule and
is adhered to in England, the Federal Courts and some states.
Studies have demonstrated that such a rule is supported by good
reasons for its acceptance. 93 However, the Uniform Rules would not
abolish the recognized rules in North Dakota that a judge-during
the course of a trial, 94 or in giving the charge to the jury15 - may
not comment upon the weight of evidence or the credibility of
witnesses.
RULE 7. General Abolition of Disqualifications and Privi-
leges of Witnesses, and of Exclusionary Rules. Except as other-
wise provided in these Rules, (a) every person is qualified to
89. See note 85 supra at 348.
90. See note 83 supra.
91. Smith v. Knutson, 78 N.D. 43, 47 N.W.2d 537 (1951).
92. Model Code rule 8: "Comment by judge. After the close of the evidence and
arguments of counsel the judge may sum up the evidence and comment to the jury upon
the weight of the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses, if he instructs the jury that
they are to determine for themselves the weight of the evidence and the credit to be
given to the witnesses and are not bound by the judge's comment thereon."
93. Morgan, The Law of Evidence 9-21 (1927). "(1) It saves time and expense by
bringing quicker verdicts, reducing the number of disagreements, and diminishing the
number of new trials and applications for new trials. (2) It has an appreciable effect upon
a substantial percentage of attorneys in making them spend less time in examining pros-
pective jurors. In this connection, it is interesting to note that in England there is practically
no expenditure of time in selecting a jury, and to ponder whether the privilege of comment,
so vigorously used there, is not a contributing cause to this desirable end. (3) It operates
toa considerable degree to induce the trial judge to pay close attention to the conduct of
-the trial."
94. Jlennenfent v. Flath, 66 N.W.2d 533 (N.D. 1954).
95. See Section 28-1411 pertaining to civil proceedings and Section 29-2130 pertaining
to criminal proceedings which, in effect, limit the trial court's instructions to matters .of
law. N.D. Rev. Code (1943).
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be a witness, and (b) no person has a privilege to refuse to be
a witness, and (c) no person is disqualified to testify to any
matter, and (d) no person has a privilege to refuse to disclose
any matter or to produce any object or writing, and (e) no
person has a privilege that another shall not be a witness or
shall not disclose any matter or shall not produce any object
or writing, and (f) all relevant evidence is admissible.
This is perhaps the most significant of the eight rules in Article
1.11 The effect of this rule is to abolish every restriction upon the
receipt of relevant evidence, irrespective of its source, except as
is otherwise provided by the restrictive provisions in other articles
of the Uniform Rules. Such a rule is essential to any comprehensive
revision of the law of evidence. The basic premise upon which the
Uniform Rules have been drafted is that ascertainment of truth in
legal controversy requires that the trier of fact have access to all
relevant evidence. A code--or rules--of evidence may not concern
itself with tests of relevancy; these can only be found in logic and
experience. It may only deal conveniently and practically with
questions of admissibility. To paraphrase Professor Thayer, all
evidence that is logically probative is admissible unless excluded by
a rule of law founded upon some paramount policy consideration.
97
Public policy may require the exclusion of privileged communica-
tions. Some evidence may be lacking in probative value, such as
hearsay. Some evidence may be misused or overestimated by the
trier of fact, such as offers to compromise a wrongful act. Thus
Rule 7 adopts the basic premise of Professor Thayer and others,
and follows the pattern of the Model Code, by providing generally
for the admissibility of all relevant evidence and then in subsequent
articles imposes limitations upon this admissibility.98 These re-
strictive rules are of five classes, each of which is treated in a separ-
ate article: (1) qualification of witnesses; (2) personal privileges;
(3) extrinsic public policy rules; (4) hearsay; and (5) authentica-
tion of writings.
Second, this rule has the effect of invalidating all prior law, thus
permitting the comprehensive formulation of exclusionary rules
uninhibited by prior statutory and case precedents. As will be
seen later, the exclusionary rules in subsequent Articles operating as
96. For a discussion of the approach taken in drafting the Uniform Rules in light of
Rule 7, see Card, Kansas Law and the New Uniform Rules of Evidence, 2 Kan. L. Rev.
333, 336-337 (1954).
97. Thayer, A Preliminary Treatise on Evidence 265 (1898). See also, Model Code .of
Evidence 11 (1942)*. For at least one practicing attorney's approvl, _see DeParcq, The
Uniform Rules of Evidence: A Plaintiff's'View, 40 Minn. L. Rev. 301, 405 (1956).
98. Thayer, op. cit. supra note 97; Model Code rule 9.
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a limitation on Rule 7 will not result in too many novel changes in
the law of North Dakota. The extent to which the Uniform Rules
result in a non-recognition of present North Dakota rules can be
made clearer following a comparison of the two systems.
RULE 8. Preliminary Inquiry 'by Judge. When the qualifica-
tion of a person to be a witness, or the admissibility of evidence,
or the existence of a privilege is stated in these rules to be
subject to a condition, and the fulfillment of the condition is
in issue, the issue is to be determined by the judge, and he shall
indicate to the parties which one has the burden of producing
evidence and the burden of proof on such issue as implied by
the rule under which the question arises. The judge may hear
and determine such matters out of the presence or hearing of
the jury, except that on the admissibility of a confession the
judge, if requested, shall hear and determine the question out
of the presence and hearing of the jury. But this rule shall not
be construed to limit the right of a party to introduce before
the jury evidence relevant to weight or credibility.
This rule focuses attention upon a problem that has often created
considerable difficulty for the courts in reconciling the respective
functions of judge and jury in the trial of issues of fact.99 It is uni-
versally recognized that the admissibility of evidence is to be
determined by the judge if the relevancy or competency of a fact
does not depend upon the existence or non-existenc of another dis-
puted fact. Such is the rule in North Dakota.10 However, the
courts have not always agreed upon who must decide a disputed
question of fact which conditions the admissibility of the evi-
dence.10 ' An analysis of the problem, the Uniform rule and the
law of North Dakota can best be considered by dividing our treat-
ment of the subject into preliminary questions of fact dealing with
competency and those dealing with relevance. Questions of com-
petency involve a determination of whether relevant facts shall be
excluded under applicable exclusionary rules. For example, suppose
A seeks to offer in evidence a copy of a writing under Rule 70 of
the Uniform Rules. B objects on the grounds of the failure to meet
the condition under Rule 70 that a copy of an original may not be in-
troduced where the latter is destroyed with a fraudulent intent.
If this is true the evidence may not be received. Who is to decide
whether the fact exists: judge or jury? The traditional view is that
the judge shall decide questions of competency and-as has been
99. See Morgan, Function of judge and Jury in the Determination of Preliminary Ques-
tions of Fact, 43 Harv. L. Rev. 165 (1929); Maguire and Epstein, Preliminary Questions
of Fact in Determining the Admissibility of Evidence, 40 Harv. L. Rev. 392 (1927).
100. King v. Hanson, 13 N.D. 85, 99 N.W. 1085 (1904).
101. See note 99 supra.
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seen-it is incorporated in Rule 8. It appears that the problem may
be treated differently in North Dakota. In King v. Hanson, the
Supreme Court said:
"The rule which meets our approval-and it is one entirely
consistent with the separate functions of judge and jury, and is
adapted to sound practice-is that when the question of ad-
missibility rests upon disputed facts, the court may submit the
evidence to the jury with proper hypothetical instructions.""2
The language of the court here and elsewhere in its opinion
leaves little doubt that it is in the discretion of the trial judge as to
whether he will decide the question or leave it to the jury. How-
ever, where the competency of evidence is in question sound rea-
sons support the Uniform rule. Indeed, while the Supreme Court
of North Dakota has more recently approved of the rule as laid
down in the King case, it stated that it should be narrowly con-
fined and took notice of the criticisms of the practice as outlined
in Professor Wigmore's treatise.10 3 The practice of leaving such
questions to the jury requires of jurors the almost impossible task
of separating preliminary questions from ultimate questions; it re-
quires of them the task of ruling upon questions of admissibility,
then erasing the objectionable evidence from its mind and basing
its verdict only upon the admissible evidence; and it frustrates the
chief objectives of the exclusionary rules particularly where the
policy of protection of an interest is involved. 1°' In the words of
Professor Morgan, "(i)n short, there is no argument for departure
from the orthodox practice of permitting the jury to decide the
question which does not strike at the validity of the exclusionary
rules themselves."10
5
A different problem arises when the admissibility of evidence
depends upon its relevancy. A sues B to recover for services render-
ed under an alleged contract for the sale of land. B seeks to offer
evidence of a different contract based upon negotiations with C
which took place in A's office. The relevancy of the evidence de-
pends upon whether C is the authorized agent of A.106 Is this preli-
minary fact determined by the judge as a condition to the admissi-
bility of the evidence of a different contract or should the condition-
ally relevant fact be admitted and the question of agency left to
the jury for determination? A decision on the question of agency is
102. See note 100 supra.
103* Schmidt v. Stone, 50 N.D. 91, 194 N.W. 917 (1923). See Wigmore, 1 2550 (3d ed.
1940); McCormick, J 53 (1954);
104. Morgan, upra note 99 at 168-169.
105. Morgan, supra note 99 at 189.
106. See Huston v. Johnson, 29 N.D. 546, 151 N.W. 774 (1915).
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but an element in deciding upon the probative value of the evidence
of the contract offered by B which is a proper question for the
jury.1 17 Here, the reasons for requiring the judge to determine dis-
puted preliminary questions of fact relating to competency do not
apply. The conditionally relevant fact should be admitted after
which the adversary may then offer evidence in rebuttal. The jury
would then resolve the dispute.' 01 The Uniform Rules deal with
rules of exclusion-or the competency of evidence-and do not pur-
port to consider problems in relevancy. Rule 8 would appear to
apply only to preliminary questions of fact conditioning com-
petency. Thus, under the Uniform Rules preliminary questions of
fact conditioning relevancy are jury questions. Although no recent
North Dakota decisions have been found an early case is in accord
with this rule.1"'
Rule 8 represents an extensive modification of the corresponding
Rule 11 of the Model Code particularly in connection with leaving
the determination on questions of who has the burden of proof and
producing evidence in preliminary questions of fact to the discretion
of the judge rather than to a rule of thumb. Two additional new
features in Rule 8 are requiring-when a request is made-hearings
on confessions to be held out of the presence of the jury and in-
corporating a saving clause to insure that the jury is entitled to
hear weaknesses in admitted evidence.
(To Be Continued)
107. See McCormick, §53 (1954).
108. Huston v. Johnson, supra note 9.
109. Huston v. Johnson, supra note 9.
